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Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis-Has It
Become a Paper Tiger?
GENE R. SHREVE*

It is difficult to imagine a branch of American law where scholars have exerted
greater influence than in conflicts, or to imagine a more influential conflicts scholar
than Brainerd Currie. This helps to explain the attention paid in this Symposium to
Currie. What is puzzling is that his ideas are still capable of generating so much
controversy. Except in a biographical sense, the plans Currie had for American
conflicts law over twenty years ago are no longer of great importance. What is
important is how, or whether, courts have responded to his ideas. The purpose of this
Comment is to suggest that, contrary to what the contributions of Professors Lea
Brilmayer and Friedrich Juenger t might indicate, there is little in Currie's governmental interest theory left to attack. The two most significant aspects of Currie's
theory were: (1) appreciation of interest analysis as a choice of law technique, 2 and
(2) the conclusion that an interested forum must always apply its own law.3 The first
aspect has enjoyed such widespread acceptance in modem choice of law theory that
it is hard to regard it as controversial. The second aspect, though controversial, has
been greeted by such a lack of judicial acceptance that it no longer poses a concern.
Currie's writing on interest analysis was his principal contribution to the
development of modem conflicts theory. He was chiefly responsible for the analytic
technique of determining state interests from an examination of the substantive
policies of the rules vying for acceptance. His contributions can be seen as part of a
larger movement away from formalism and toward instrumentalism in procedural
jurisprudence. 4 With others, 5 he questioned the formalism of the original Restatement
of Conflicts and its blindness to the substantive content of rules. 6 He articulated the
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"true" conflict, where the substantive policies of each rule were at stake on the facts
of the case. 7 Currie's ideas of interest analysis have had widespread judicial and
academic acceptance. By whatever name, all modem choice of law approaches
include in their design some mechanism for probing the interests of the forum and
other jurisdictions by investigating the extent to which policies accounting for
substantive rules will be advanced through their application in the particular case. 8
In contrast, Currie's approach to forum favoritism has seldom been adopted by
courts. Courts have rarely been willing to dismiss the law of another apparently
interested jurisdiction on the ground that, because the forum is interested, forum law
must apply. 9 Courts may have balked not so much because invariable application of
the law of the interested forum is unprincipled as because the sweep of Currie's rule
deprives courts of the opportunity to sound principled. 10 Moreover, Currie's approach
may not have given courts enough to work with. His methodology stressed the
important concern of interest analysis to the neglect of two other concerns: problems
of judicial administration and party fairness.Il Currie's approach has not been able to
compete with other modem approaches in the judicial marketplace. Courts unwilling
to relinquish the idea of forum neutrality opt for the Second Restatement of Conflicts. 1 2 Courts willing to favor forum law, but wishing to sound principled while
doing so, prefer Leflar's ostensibly neutral but eminently malleable choiceinfluencing considerations. 13
Today, Currie's governmental interest analysis is scarcely more than a paper
tiger. His view that the interest of a jurisdiction in the advancement of its substantive
policies is a valid choice of law concern is accepted by most as a basic tenet of modem
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summarized in R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 8, at 370-71. As Professor Weintraub notes, the Oregon Supreme Court
subsequently appears to have recanted in Casey v. Manson Constr. and Eng'g Co., 247 Or. 274, 428 P.2d 898 (1967).
Id. at 371.
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created no need or opportunity for a court to say that the forum was the more interested of two interested jurisdictions.
Yet, courts seemed to want credit for that point when they felt they could make it. It follows that they would prefer a choice
of law approach which attaches legal significance to the fact that the forum is the more interested. This may explain in
part the Currie methodology's lack of judicial popularity. It may also explain the California Supreme Court's marriage
of Currie analysis with the essentially incompatible interest-comparing concept of "comparative impairment" in Bernhard
v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 546 P.2d 719, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215 (1976).
11. The importance of dealing with concerns of party fairness at the level of choice of law doctrine has increased
in light of the refusal of the United States Supreme Court in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) to read
effective fairness protections into the due process clause of the Constitution. See Kozyris, Reflections on Allstate-The
Lessening of Due Process in Choice of Law, 14 U.C.D. L. REv. 889, 901-06 (1981); Shreve, In Search of a
Choice-of-Law Reviewing Standard-Reflectionson Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 66 MINN.L. REv. 327, 345-55 (1982).
12. The Second Restatement "is written from the viewpoint of a neutral forum which has no interest of its own to
protect and is seeking only to apply the most appropriate law." Reese, Conflict of Laws and the Restatement Second, 28
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13. See Leflar, supra note 8. Elsewhere, I have attempted to demonstrate that the migration of courts to Leflar's
approach can be explained, at least in substantial part, by the fact that his choice-influencing considerations technique has
offered a means of advancing forum interests which, if less chauvinistic in appearance than Currie's approach, is no less
efficient. Shreve, supra note 11, at 342.
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theory. t4 In terms of judicial acceptance, his more controversial ideas were stillborn. t5 It is understandable that continental scholars like Professor Dimitrios Evrigenist6 express polite wonder over the amount of time American conflicts scholars still
spend rehearsing points of governmental interest debate. This Symposium would be
exceedingly valuable if it did no more than lay to rest many of the scholarly
antagonisms over Currie's work. Other topics, such as the relationship between
conflicts and personal jurisdiction and developments in the codification of conflicts
doctrine, deserve our attention.
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